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COMMENTARIES

OVERRULING ERIE: NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTIONS AND
NATIONAL COMMON LAW
SUZANNA SHERRY*

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005' (CAFA) reflects a sharp
change of direction in contemporary thinking about federalism. It
expands federal jurisdiction substantially, placing many more state law
claims into federal court. In so doing, it highlights and attempts to
resolve the tension that has always existed between state and national
interests.
In this Commentary, I argue that the enactment of CAFA amounts
to swimming halfway across a river. Professor Linda Silberman's
thoughtful and well-argued proposal' is a valiant attempt to keep from
drowning while treading water in the middle of the river. I suggest
that instead of treading water, we should swim the rest of the way.
The river I am talking about is federal mistrust of statejudges. And
the far shore we are heading toward is Swift v. Tyson. In other words, I
want to make the proposal that Judith Resnik describes as "a more energetic claim" than those made so far,4 that Richard Marcus and
Stephen Burbank say is foreclosed by CAFA's legislative history," and

t Herman 0. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. I
thank Richard Nagareda for comments on an earlier draft.
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2 Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions,
156 U. PA. L.
REv. 2001 (2008).
341
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1(1842).
4 Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalismfrom the 1960s Class Action Rule and
the 2005
Class Action Fairness Act: "The PoliticalSafeguards" of Aggregate TranslocalActions, 156 U.
PA. L. REv. 1929, 1935 (2008).
5 See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity
and Hypocrisy, -106 COLUM. L. REv. 1924, 1943 & n.129 (2006) ("[T]here is evidence
that in enacting CAFA, Congress did not intend to alter the ordering of federal and
state lawmaking authority established by Erie v. Tompkins and its progeny."); Stephen B.
Burbank, The Class Action FairnessAct of 2005 in HistoricalContext: Preliminary View, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1529 (2008) (quoting S. REP. No. 109-14 (2005) for the proposition that CAFA does not change the application of Erie); Richard L. Marcus, Assessing
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that even Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine Sharkey offer only as a descriptive prediction of possible future developments: 6 CAFA should be
read as overruling ErieRailroad Co. v. Tompkins, at least for the nationalmarket cases8 that it places within federal courtjurisdiction.
The skeleton of my argument is as follows: First, mistrust of state
interference with national markets should be viewed as the norm, and
Erie as the aberration. Second, despite its explicit intent to leave Erie
in place, Congress squarely based CAFA on this norm. Finally, we
cannot have it both ways: either we trust state judges or we do not.
To the extent that Congress tried to adopt both positions, courts must
find a single consistent interpretation of the statute-they must head
for one shore or the other. I know which way I would swim.
Let me start with mistrust of state interference with the nationalmarket economy. Justice Story's opinion in Swift eloquently presented
the conventional nineteenth-century view.
My favorite quotation,
however, comes from a case two decades before Swift. In 1821, Chief
Justice Marshall rejected one of Virginia's many attempts to place its
own policy above that of Congress: "That the United States form, for
many, and for most important purposes, a single nation, has not yet
been denied. In war, we are one people. In making peace, we are
one people. In all commercial regulations, we are one and the same
people."" Marshall thus put national economic policies on the same
plane as foreign relations-a federalized subject that must be protected from individual state obstruction.
Diversity jurisdiction, properly understood, also fosters a national
market and a federalized commercial liability regime. The origins of
diversity are famously unclear. 0 Under any reading, however, protect-

CAFA's StatedJurisdictionalPolicy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1812 (2008) (deeming the

argument that CAFA displaces Erieboth too broad and too narrow).
6 See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,53 UCLA
L. REv. 1353, 1419-20 (2006) (explaining that federal courts will need to develop "incremental decisional law").
7 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8 By "national-market cases" I mean to invoke Issacharoff's definition
of nationalmarket activity: "conduct that arises from mass produced goods entering the stream of
commerce with no preset purchaser or destination." Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action FairnessAct, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1842 (2006).
9 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,413
(1821).
10See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action FairnessAct in Perspective: The Old and
the New in FederalJurisdictionalReform, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1823, 1833 (2008) (explaining
that the constitutional framers and ratifiers provided little rationale for adopting diversityjurisdiction).
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ing national-market interests from state interference was a significant
purpose behind diversity jurisdiction." But that purpose is in direct
tension with Erie: it does not make much sense, in terms of protection
from aberrant or biased states, to place cases in federal courts but let
state judges make the substantive rules. It is, in Professor Silberman's
memorable characterization from an analogous context, paying more
attention to where the defendant will be hanged than to whether he
will be."2 Indeed, it is probably not logical to let state legislatures determine the law in cases involving national commerce, and in that
sense Swift did not go far enough (but that argument is beyond the
scope of this Commentary).
So why did the same generation-and even many of the same individuals-that adopted Article III also enact the Rules of Decision
Act?" Why, in fact, did the same Congress enact both the predecessor
of § 133214 and the Rules of Decision Act? This question is difficult
only if we assume Erie's reading of the Rules of Decision Act-but Erie
was probably wrong.
As other scholars have shown, the more historically accurate interpretation of the Act is that it was either limited to state legislative
enactments (as Swift held), or that it was meant as a directive to apply
American rather than English law, not as a directive to apply state
rather than federal law.' The best textual evidence for the latter interpretation is the use of the term "the laws of the several states"
rather than "the laws of the respective states.""' In eighteenth-century
parlance, that distinction signaled the difference between law common to the states and the laws of each individual state."7 The historical evidence is too voluminous to canvass here, but the very fact that
Erie's reading of the Act is in tension with the acknowledged purposes of
11See,

e.g., David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action FairnessAct, and Some Federalism hnplications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1247, 1265-70 (2007) (citing
several sources to explain that federal courts were thought to better appreciate the
needs of an interstate economy).
12 LindaJ. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53
N.Y.U. L. REV. 33,
88 (1978).
J3
judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652).
14 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(2000).
15

See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT
OF 1789,

126-48 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990); PatrickJ. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72
TEX. L. REv. 79, 105-06 (1993).
16 Ritz, supra note 15, at
148.
17 Id.
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diversity jurisdiction should suggest that Swift might be closer to the
original meaning of the Act.
From the founding to the early twentieth century, then, American
jurists believed that state judges could not be trusted either to develop
or to apply a body of law that would foster a growing national economy. Diversity jurisdiction worked with the Swift doctrine to put that
body of law into the capable hands of federal judges. Without both a
federal forum and federal substantive law, there would still be opportunities for state judges to implement policies that served the needs of
their own constituency but not those of the nation.
As several of the articles in this Symposium point out, Congress
recognized the problem of state courts acting to increase in-state benefits and export costs. With CAFA, Congress intentionally and explicitly
sought to solve this problem by returning to the previous regime. One
of the three listed purposes is to "restore the intent of the framers of
the United States Constitution."' That intent, as Congress saw it, was to
prevent state interference with national markets, and CAFA therefore
places cases involving the national economy into the federal courts.
As I have argued, however, the only way to make sense of the
framers' intention regarding diversity jurisdiction is to see it as yoked
to the Swi doctrine. By moving national cases into federal court,
CAFA thus achieves only half of its goal. Congress focused on state
courtjudges recklessly certifying nationwide class actions, but ignored
the possibility that those same judges might recklessly develop state
substantive tort liability in ways that similarly hamper nationwide markets. Blinded by almost seventy years of unquestioned adherence to
Erie, Congress apparently could not see that cases in federal court
could still be hijacked by aberrant state law..
In a nutshell, then, CAFA fails to remedy the negative consequences of Erie. Individual states can still impose their laws on the nation, and the vertical forum shopping that occurred under Swift has
been replaced by horizontal forum shopping. As Howard Erichson's
article demonstrates, CAFA has simply changed the shape of that
horizontal forum shopping but has not eliminated it. 9
So what is the solution? Silberman suggests that we adopt an antiKlaxon"' rule. Instead of applying the choice of law rules of the state

18
19

28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005).
Howard M. Erichson, CAFA 's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
CAFA § 2(b) (2),

1593, 1606 (2008).
20 Klaxon

Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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in which they sit, she proposes, federal courts in CAFA cases should
apply a unified federal choice of law rule.21 She is in good company,
as quite a number of scholars have urged the adoption of federal
choice of law rules-either by congressional enactment
or by judicial
22
CAFA.
of
enactment
the
after
and
before
action-both
But to jettison Klaxon is to mistake the tip of the iceberg for the
behemoth below. As long as the fifty states remain free to shape their
laws as they wish, and federal courts must apply some state's law, litigants will attempt to game the system. Silberman almost concedes as
much when she writes that "any choice of law rule that is adopted
should be one that continues to respect the different substantive
judgments reflected in the laws of different states., 23 Erie's error was
exactly its protection of those different substantive judgments, despite
their ability to wreak havoc on a national economy.
All of this leads to the conclusion that if we share the concerns
that prompted Congress to adopt CAFA, we must reject Erie. But
Congress said that it meant to retain Erie. What should we make of
this inconsistency? I propose three arguments in support of interpreting CAFA to have overruled Erie for cases within CAFA's scope, despite
an apparent congressional intent to the contrary.
First, the practical effect of combining CAFA and Erie-with or
without Klaxon-is to choke off almost all nationwide class actions,
which conflicts with the stated purpose of "assur[ing] fair and prompt
recoveries for class members with legitimate claims. " 1 4 If the real purpose of the statute is, as some have suggested, primarily to protect
corporate defendants from class-wide liability," keeping Erie achieves

Silberman, supra note 2, at 2002.
See, e.g.,
William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1,
3242 (1963); Borchers, supra note 15, at 124-31; Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the
Dismal Swamp: The Casefor FederalChoice ofLaw Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 (1991); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Has the Erie Doctrine Been Repealed By Congress?, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1629 (2008); Issacharoff, supra note 8, at 1865-66; Friedrich K Juenger, Mass Disasters
and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 105, 121-22; Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1918-22 (2006); Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrapping in Choice of
Law After the Class Action FairnessAct, 74 UMKC L. REv. 661, 678-83 (2006).
23 Silberman, supra note
2, at 2033.
24 CAFA § 2(b)(1), 28
U.S.C. § 1711 note.
25 See, e.g., Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch,
supra note 5, at 1941-43 (calling the
expressed purposes of CAFA "window dressing" to the true goal of preventing the certification of some classes that state courts might certify); Alan B. Morrison, Removing
Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way To Handle the Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1528-31 (2005) (acknowledging efforts of potential class
21
22
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that goal. We should, however, balk at any statutory interpretation
that allows Congress to achieve its goals by stealth. If Congress wants
to cut down on the number of nationwide class actions, it should do
so directly rather than surreptitiously through the retention of Erie.
Second, Congress put its intent to return to the framers' vision
into the statute itself, while the retention of Erie appears only in the
legislative history. If I am right that these two goals are inconsistent,
the one in the statute should prevail.
Finally, there is precedent for interpreting a statute contrary to
Congress's wishes in similar circumstances. We should look to the relationship between Congress's two inconsistent intentions. The protection of national markets is the underlying, broader purpose of
CAFA; the retention of Erie is merely a prohibition on a particular
means of achieving that broader goal. The problem is that Congress
was mistaken: the broader goal cannot be accomplished without the
use of the prohibited means.
The Supreme Court faced exactly the same situation almost thirty
years ago, and it interpreted the statute at issue to favor the broader
goal and to allow the prohibited means. The case was United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,26 which upheld private affirmative action despite
27
Title VII's absolute ban on racial discrimination.
The clear text of
the statute, as well as numerous statements in the legislative history,
unequivocally pointed to the conclusion that Congress had meant to
ban all racial discrimination by employers. But the Court rejected
what it called a "literal" approach, because interpreting Title VII to
ban affirmative action would be "at variance with the purpose of the
,,281
statute.
In other words, Congress thought that it could accomplish
its broader goal of social and economic integration while still prohibiting employers from using race as a criterion. The Court recognized
the impossibility of doing both-and it interpreted the statute in accordance with its broader goal. Courts should do the same with CAFA.
Three final objections to my proposal are worthy of brief mention.
First, does Congress have the power to overrule Erie, or is Erie based
on constitutional principles? Although Justice Brandeis's opinion
rested in part on constitutional limitations on federal power, 29 there
action defendants-often corporations-to push CAFA through in order to stay out of
unfair state courts).
26 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
27 Id. at 209.
28 Id. at 201-02 (internal citations omitted).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
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has always been great controversy about the validity of that part of the
holding. In any case, there should be no constitutional obstacles to
concluding that Erie does not apply to CAFA cases. To the extent that
Erie rests on federalism concerns, post-1938 developments in Commerce Clause jurisprudence vitiate those concerns: Congress certainly
has power to regulate the substantive law governing nationally distributed goods. To the extent that Erie instead rests on separation-ofpowers concerns, my argument reads CAFA as a legislative authorization for judicial development of substantive common law in the context
of nationwide class actions. Thus, even if the application of federal
common law in an ordinary tort case such as Erie itself would be unconstitutional, the national-market cases within CAFA's scope are distinguishable.
A second and related objection is that even if courts are not constitutionally precluded from developing the substantive law that
should govern national products liability cases, Congress is still the
more appropriate venue for such federal lawmaking. My response to
this objection is practical: Congress is gridlocked and hopelessly partisan, and is unlikely ever to enact national tort legislation. CAFA is as
good as it gets on that front. Moreover, state tort doctrines were
originally common law (although many have since been codified by
state legislatures), and there is no reason why federal courts should
not take the lead in developing a federal common law for mass torts.
Indeed, allowing incremental judicial lawmaking may ultimately produce a body of law worthy of congressional codification.''
Finally, there is the problem of CAFA's overly broad scope. As
both Professors Marcus and Burbank have noted, CAFA's minimum
diversity provisions combine with the fiction of corporate citizenship
to place within federal jurisdiction cases that are not truly national .
The best response to this problem would be for Congress to recognize
it and amend CAFA, but that seems unlikely. Under my proposal,
then, would federal courts have the power to apply federal common

s0 See, e.g.,John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 704-05
(1974); PaulJ. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-the Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1682, 1688 (1974); see also Resnik, supra note 4, at 1943.
31 For a prior example of such judicial innovation followed by successful
congressional adoption, see Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law
in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REv. 309, 312-13 (2002), describing the path from judicial
receiverships to federal bankruptcy law.
32 Burbank, Class Action FainessAct, supra note 5, at 1525-28; Marcus,
supra note 5,
at 1806.
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law to such cases? I am tempted to take the uncompromising position
that they would: despite the absence of a national class, there is still a
national interest as long as the goods are part of an undifferentiated
national market. It is neither absurd nor unconstitutional to interpret
CAFA as functionally equating such cases to nationwide class actions.
In the end, though, nationwide class actions and class actions involving citizens of a single state suing an out-of-state corporation are
distinguishable for purposes of my proposal. The latter cases are
much closer to Erie itself, in that they involve great state interests and
only marginal federal interests. One can therefore argue either that
Congress did not mean to-and did not need to-overrule Erie for
those cases, or that congressional power over the substantive law in
such cases would skate so close to the edge of the Commerce Clause
power that we should read CAFA as not authorizing judicial lawmaking
in this instance.
I close with a passage from Professor Silberman's article, which I
think highlights Congress's futile attempt to stand in the middle of
the river:
[J]ustice is not an abstract principle: it is in the mind of the beholder.
The communities in which the parties reside and act-the relevant state
or nation-define the applicable principles of justice for that community. Conflicts arise because the lawmaking bodies of different states and
different nations see the world quite differently.33

What CAFA has done is redefine the relevant community. When
it comes to national-market activity, the relevant community is now
the nation rather than the individual states. Accordingly, the substantive principles ofjustice ought to be federal as well.

33 Silberman, supra note 2, at 2023 (internal quotation marks and footnote omit-
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